Page 1

AU/ACSC/3028/2004-05

AIR COMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGE

AIR UNIVERSITY

LOSING THE WAR FOR U.S. PUBLIC OPINION DURING THE

VIETNAM WAR

by

Marco P. Giorgi, LCDR, USN

A Research Report Submitted to the Faculty

In Partial Fulfillment of the Graduation Requirements

Instructor: Lt Col Ruth Latham

Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama

April 2005

Distribution A: Approved for Public Release; Distribution is Unlimited

Disclaimer

The views expressed in this academic research paper are those of the author and do not

reflect the official policy or position of the US government or the Department of Defense. In

accordance with Air Force Instruction 51-303, it is not copyrighted, but is the property of the

United States government.

ii

Contents

Page

DISCLAIMER .................................................................................................................... ii

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS............................................................................................. iv

PREFACE............................................................................................................................v

ABSTRACT....................................................................................................................... vi

INTRODUCTION ...............................................................................................................1

A BRIEF HISTORICAL REVIEW OF THE VIETNAM WAR ........................................4

BLAZING A PATH TO DEFEAT......................................................................................6

MASS MEDIA AND PUBLIC OPINION ........................................................................10

AMERICA’S ALTERNATIVE PRESS............................................................................12

AMERICAN DEMONSTRATORS ..................................................................................15

THE COMMUNIST STRATEGY ....................................................................................19

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE FUTURE.................................................................23

SUMMARY.......................................................................................................................29

ENDNOTES ......................................................................................................................31

BIBLIOGRAPHY..............................................................................................................35

iii

Illustrations

Page

Figure 1. North Vietnamese Communist Party Organization.............................................8

Figure 2. Communist and Other Subversive Affiliations of New MOBE Leaders ..........16

iv

Preface

Vietnam was a military loss and national tragedy. America suffered tens of thousands of

casualties in a strategic defeat. In the end, we lost because we quit. We quit because we lost the

war for public opinion and public support. I hope that we will never let that happen again.

I would like to thank the brave men and women who served their nation during the Vietnam

War. The people on active duty now will never forget the sacrifices you made, and we know that

we owe the wonderful military we have now to you. Thank you.

Additionally, I owe a debt of gratitude to the people behind the Vietnam project at Texas

Tech University. Their online archive of primary source material was invaluable to my research.

My research seminar course instructor, Lt Col Ruth Latham forced me to the early realization

that this paper was not going to write itself. For that and her excellent instruction, I thank her.

My greatest debt of gratitude is to my family, who supported my efforts in every way.

v

AU/ACSC/3028/2004-05

Abstract

The North Vietnamese communists, under the leadership of Ho Chi Minh had a

sophisticated media and propaganda strategy. Through the historical method, this paper

describes and analyzes how the United States lost the war for American public opinion to the

North Vietnamese. Realizing they were not likely to win on the field of battle against American

forces, the North Vietnamese communists opened up a new front on American soil. The weapons

were propaganda and agitation, with the soldiers being American citizens fighting a propaganda

war for Vietnam who supported a world of communism. The anti-war movement undermined

public support for the Vietnam War through the mass media, the alternative press, and protests.

This work examines connections between the U.S. anti-war movement and communist

organizations and recommends courses of action the United States should take to win the war for

public opinion in the future.

vi

Introduction

Should I become President...I will not risk American lives...by permitting

any other nation to drag us into the wrong war at the wrong place at the

wrong time through an unwise commitment that is unwise militarily,

unnecessary to our security and unsupported by our allies

-John F. Kennedy, speech, New York Times, October 13, 1960

Less than seven months after this speech, President John F. Kennedy ordered 400 Special

Forces soldiers and 100 advisors to Vietnam.1 The Vietnam War was controversial when it was

fought, and still casts a long shadow over America. Forty-two years after sailing with President

Kennedy in Nantucket, R.I, Senator John F. Kerry made his naval service in Vietnam a central

theme of his unsuccessful 2004 presidential campaign to unseat President George W. Bush, an

Air National Guard fighter pilot during the war. The campaign exposed strong, enduring

feelings about the war, the anti-war movement, politics, and policies of the Vietnam War period

in America.

No event in American history is more misunderstood than the Vietnam

War. It was misreported then, and it is misremembered now.

-Richard M. Nixon, 1985

One of the reasons for the controversy surrounding the Vietnam War is that America

lost. We made a number of mistakes in our conduct of the war in Vietnam. Some of those

mistakes led us to lose the information war, and the information war was critical to overall

success. America’s loss in Vietnam provides us with lessons about how we can do things

today to avoid repeating the mistakes of yesterday.

1

This document addresses America’s loss of the information component of the Vietnam

War. First, beginning with a brief, broad, historical review of the Vietnam War, this paper

addresses the circumstances leading to American involvement in Vietnam. The seeds of the

Vietnam War were planted immediately after World War II. Japan, then France controlled

Vietnam before America became involved in the conflict there. The Vietnamese revolted

against both Japanese and French rule. While the French were being forced out, America

supported France’s attempt to maintain her colonial rule. Once the Vietnamese drove the

French out of their country, American fear of world communism drove us to expand our

commitment in Vietnam.2

Second, this paper describes the relationship between the American people, the mass

media, and the alternative press, as well as the U.S. government’s media strategy. American

mass media was generally behind the war effort and the dissident press against it from the

start. The American government employed a strategy of deception at home that ended up

working against it, as it seriously compromised the credibility of government officials.

Consequently, the American people lost confidence in their government and started to oppose

the war. As public opinion against the war increased, so did the strength of the agitation and

propaganda campaigns against the war. The mass media, having been lied to by the

government, and seeing public opinion shift against the war, began to oppose the war.

Third, this paper describes the communist view of the press, North Vietnam’s

information warfare strategy, and the propaganda and agitation campaigns waged on U.S. soil.

Additionally, this section examines relationships between American individuals and

organizations and Hanoi, Moscow, and international communist organizations. North

Vietnamese leaders were well educated in the tenets of communism and the proper relationship

2

between the party, the people, and the press espoused by Lenin and the Soviet politburo.

Having a thorough understanding of the press, propaganda, and agitation, as well as having

had first-hand experience waging an information war against the French, the North Vietnamese

communists were well prepared to fight the information war against America. Hanoi, having

garnered many allies in the U.S. through international communism, had proxies fighting the

war for them on American soil. These proxies had an intimate understanding of the American

system and society and were able to fight effectively for Hanoi and international communism.

Finally, this paper explains how the North Vietnamese, their allies and supporters, were

able to defeat the United States government in the war for American public support, and

recommends courses of action necessary to enable American victory in future wars for public

opinion. The North Vietnamese information war, run by Hanoi with the assistance of

American proxies and Soviet advisors was superbly coordinated and executed. Overmatched

in every combat area, the communist party of this small, poor nation was able to overcome

America, one of the major powers of the time. They did this by executing a three-pronged

strategy. First, they employed a robust information campaign, attacking the American

people’s will to fight, by spreading propaganda and agitating on American soil. Second, the

North Vietnamese military strategy was based upon prolonging the war for as long as possible,

further sapping the American people’s resolve. Third, they used negotiations as opportunities

to build themselves sanctuaries in time, allowing their military forces to reconstitute, with no

intention of successfully negotiating a cessation of hostilities. We should learn from the

mistakes and successes of both sides in the Vietnam War in order to plan for and execute

winning efforts of our own in the battle for public opinion here and abroad.

3

A Brief Historical Review of the Vietnam War

French Colonialism

In 1954, Vietnam, then named French Indochina, was a French colony. Vietnamese

communist insurgents named the Viet Minh, led by Ho Chi Minh, had been fighting French

colonialism since the end of World War II. May 7, 1954 the Viet Minh overran the French

garrison at Dien Bien Phu,3 setting the stage for the Geneva accords. The accords divided

Vietnam along the 17th parallel into communist North Vietnam, under Ho Chi Minh, and South

Vietnam, administered by the French. The division of Vietnam led to American involvement in

Southeast Asia.

The Geneva accords provided for elections in Vietnam in 1956 to re-unify the country.

The elections did not take place, and conflict ensued. The communist North intended to re-unify

Vietnam by force. American policy makers feared that if Vietnam fell to the communist bloc, it

would cause surrounding nations to fall as well, upsetting the balance of power in favor of

communism in Asia. This view of the region’s effect on the balance of power was the Domino

Theory.4 American policy makers’ belief in the Domino Theory set the stage for American

involvement in Vietnam.

American Involvement

In 1956, under President Eisenhower, the U.S. Military Assistance Advisory Group

(MAAG) began training South Vietnamese troops to defend their territory.5 U.S. involvement

steadily increased under President Eisenhower, and accelerated under Presidents Kennedy and

Johnson. In 1964, the U.S. Congress passed the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, officially approving

military action in Vietnam.6 As the conflict escalated; China and the Soviet Union assisted the

North Vietnamese, while the U.S. did the same for the South Vietnamese. As the Vietnam War

4

escalated, government sources told the media and the public about the tremendous losses

American forces were inflicting upon the North Vietnamese. Official sources provided a steady

stream of good news about the war.7 Meanwhile, individuals and organizations intent on

reducing American public support for the war provided the public with bad news omitted from

government statements. When North Vietnam launched the Tet offensive in January 1968, the

scope of the attacks surprised the American public. For an enemy that American forces had been

crushing for years, the communists had accomplished the seemingly impossible. Simultaneous

attacks on every major city in South Vietnam. The American media perceived Tet as a defeat for

the American military and reported it as such.8

The fact that the North Vietnamese had the strength to launch an offensive contradicted

the continuous stream of good news from official sources. Tet was the turning point in the war

for U.S. public support in Vietnam. General Vo Nguyen Giap, leader of the communist forces,

suffered a devastating military defeat. Nevertheless, he managed to win a resounding victory on

the information front.9 In 1968, U.S. public support for the constantly escalating war had ebbed

low enough to convince President Johnson not to seek re-election.10 President Nixon was

inaugurated in 1969, and popular opposition to the war was rising. The president began pulling

troops out of Vietnam in 1970. The pullouts continued, as did the bombing and fighting on the

ground, as the belligerents maneuvered for advantage in negotiations. In 1972, President Nixon

was re-elected, and in January of 1973, the U.S. and Vietnam signed the Paris Peace Accords,

officially ending American involvement in Vietnam.

North Vietnamese Communists beat the U.S. Although the North Vietnamese benefited

from Soviet and Chinese assistance, that does not explain how the U.S. lost the Vietnam War.

Vietnam fought a total war while America fought a limited war, one in which American

5

involvement was contingent upon public support. America could remain engaged in the Vietnam

War for only as long as the American public supported the war. When public support for the war

was lost, the war itself was lost.

Blazing a Path to Defeat

A Good Start

Woven throughout the history of the Vietnam War is the chronology of popular support

for the war. Early in the conflict, public support for the war was high. Americans generally

were supportive of their nation, and the mass media was generally supportive of U.S. foreign

policy.11 Unfortunately, much of the public and media support was built upon the sand of

official lies. When the American peace movement began to flourish, “there was simply no way

of reversing the trend nor of cutting off the means of communication”12 (with Hanoi).

Official Lies

The Kennedy administration, having survived a narrow election victory, was in no

position to publicly escalate an undeclared war it had inherited from the Eisenhower

administration. Meanwhile, the administration’s foreign policy team insisted that America had

to stop North Vietnam to preserve the balance of power. They saw Vietnam as “a test case of

America’s determination to uphold its commitments in a menacing world and of its capacity to

meet the new challenges posed by guerilla warfare in the emerging nations.”13 The

administration’s response was to do what it thought had to be done, even if that meant lying to

the people and the press.14 While the Kennedy administration’s deception served its short-term

political needs, it set the nation upon a path that successive administrations would feel obligated

to continue down by sunk costs, national, and personal pride.

6

At the time of President Kennedy’s assassination in 1964, there were over 16,000

American troops in Vietnam, many of them engaged in direct combat. U.S. Special Forces had

been fighting there since 1961, when the president ordered 400 Special Forces to Vietnam along

with 100 advisors.15 His successor, Lyndon Johnson, was faced with a difficult choice. Reveal

the full truth about the extent of U.S. involvement in Vietnam, tarnishing his own and his

predecessor’s image, and risking the loss of public support, or continue down the path President

Kennedy had blazed. President Johnson continued down that path, as did his successor, Richard

Nixon. Vietnam is remembered as Johnson’s war, it was,16 but it was Kennedy’s war too, and

the decision he made to institute the official practice of lying to the people and the press created

the conditions that eventually led to U.S. defeat.

As the Vietnam War continued to consume U.S. blood and treasure with no apparent

progress, public support for the war began to wane. The American media and public, having

grown increasingly distrustful of their government as the media exposed official lies, began to

turn to anyone but the government for the truth about what was going on in Vietnam. This

resulted in the American people and the press becoming open to exploitation.17 By having

government lies exposed so many times about so many things in Vietnam, the U.S. government

effectively took the most powerful weapon in the war, the media, and handed it to the enemy.

America’s Gift to Ho Chi Minh

The enemy was ready and eager to pick up and use the weapon. The international

communist community18 had long understood the power of the press.19 Lenin’s writings on

communist theory contribute significant space to detailing the power of the press and methods

for exploiting that power. Vietnamese leaders, especially Ho Chi Minh, the North Vietnamese

political leader were well versed in communist theory, having been trained by the Soviets.20 The

7

importance Vietnamese communists attached to the power of the press is evident in the fact that

the communist party structure of the time made the agitation and propaganda section directly

responsible to the politburo central executive committee (Figure 1)21

Fig. 1

North Vietnamese Communist Party Organization21

North Vietnamese leaders in the politburo and military were well positioned to execute their

propaganda campaign against the U.S., and did so with skill and ferocity.

8

By studying Marxism-Leninism parallel with participation in practical activities, I

gradually came upon the fact that only Socialism and Communism can liberate

the oppressed nations and working people throughout the world from slavery.

Leninism is not only a miraculous “Book of the Wise,” it is a compass for us

Vietnamese revolutionaries and people; it is also the radiant sun illuminating our

path to final victory, to Socialism and Communism.

-Ho Chi Minh, 1960

The communist propaganda campaign, run from Hanoi with Moscow’s assistance and

advice, aided by communist sympathizers in America, and distributed to the American people

through the main stream and dissident press began to undermine public support for the war.

Along with the propaganda campaign, the communists used a campaign of agitation to foment

unrest, create more dissent, and generate publicity for the propagandists. The communist

campaign of agitation and propaganda eventually succeeded in destroying popular support for

the Vietnam War.

While the North Vietnamese and their allies fought on the information front with the

assistance of their supporters in the U.S., it was American officials’ handling of the media and

public perception that helped set the conditions in U.S. public opinion the North Vietnamese

were able to exploit. First, America’s inability to achieve decisive victory resulted in the

Vietnam War lasting for a quarter of a century. The length of the conflict made sustaining public

support for the war a difficult proposition. Second, American leaders fought the Vietnam War

without a strategy for gaining and maintaining public support. Although the American public

and media were both patriotic when America entered the war, government mishandling of the

9

war for public opinion resulted in widespread distrust of the military and American government

officials and institutions.

Mass Media and Public Opinion

The Credibility Gap

The American public and media started the Vietnam War generally supportive of the U.S.

military.22 Over the course of the war, the support waned due to the way the military and the

administration manipulated them throughout the war. Military and administration officials

consistently exaggerated American successes and downplayed enemy strength. The difference

between official pronouncements and the truth on the ground in Vietnam became known as the

credibility gap.23 The credibility gap, created by the American government, allowed the North

Vietnamese to successfully prosecute their information campaign. After years of hearing about

the successes of military operations in Vietnam, news of the Tet offensive shocked the public.

The Tet offensive is considered the turning point in the war for American public opinion. While

support for the war was waning, Tet turned the tide in favor of the communists. “The Tet

Offensive caused public opposition to rise sharply. By the summer of 1968 Americans believed,

by a majority of two to one, that the deployment into Vietnam had been an error.”24

Tet

On January 31, 1968, the North Vietnamese launched the Tet Offensive. A team of

North Vietnamese sappers blasted a hole in the wall surrounding the U.S. embassy in Vietnam

and began their attack. Within seven hours, all of the attackers had been killed. The embassy

attack was part of a large, coordinated attack against most major urban areas in South Vietnam,

and throughout Vietnam the results were similar. The North Vietnamese attacks were repulsed

10

and the attackers killed.25 The timing of the offensive reveals that Vietnamese strategists were

driving the conduct of the shooting war as well as diplomatic and informational efforts. They

timed the offensive to coincide with the American presidential primaries in order to take

advantage of the “general instability of democracies during election periods.”26 On March 31,

1968 President Johnson announced the “halt of most bombing in North Vietnam, and that he

would not be a candidate in the next elections.”27

The Gap Exploited

Although the Tet offensive was a devastating military loss for the North Vietnamese; it

was a brilliant psychological and informational victory. The North Vietnamese planned the Tet

offensive for its psychological impact from the beginning, but two additional factors contributed

to turning a military defeat into an informational victory. The factors were: media and public

distrust of the military and administration, and complete misreporting of the Tet offensive by

mass media outlets. The administration and military had subjected the media and public to

official lies throughout the course of the war. Reporters in Vietnam were repeatedly told that

what they knew to be true was not, that the things they saw did not happen the way they saw

them, and that all was going well in the Vietnam War. The policy of lying to the press created

“an adversary relationship between the media and all parties associated with the war, except,

ironically, the enemy.”28

This situation carried over to the public and led to wide distrust of administration and

military statements. Thus, the military and administration, through an official policy of lying to

the press, sowed the seeds of their own defeat. Because the media no longer trusted U.S.

government statements, and lacked any significant ability to analyze the events of the Tet

offensive, they simply reported what they perceived to be happening. Not only was the reporting

11

factually incorrect, “the media would not even admit to any error when the true facts came to

light. The sad thing is that those controlling media policies did not have the sophistication, the

integrity, or the courage to admit their error.”29 After the fact, General Westmoreland (U.S.

Military Assistance Command Commander, Vietnam) described the reporting: “voluminous,

lurid and distorted newspaper and particularly television reporting of the Tet offensive, has

transformed a devastating Communist military defeat into a psychological victory.”30 Media

mistrust of the administration and the military led them to completely misreport the events of the

Tet offensive. Since the public also distrusted the official statements of the military and the

administration, they were easily convinced that the reports were true. This was not in spite of

official pronouncements to the contrary, but especially because of them.

After Tet, public opposition rose sharply. By the summer of 1968, Americans believed

the deployment into Vietnam had been an error by a majority of two to one.31 The US

government policy of misleading the public and the press eventually led to the creation of an

information environment that was completely vulnerable to enemy exploitation.

America’s Alternative Press

Propagandists

Prior to the Tet Offensive, mainstream media editorial commentary by television

journalist had been four to one in support of US action; after Tet they ran two to one against.32

This is in stark contrast to the alternative press that had been strongly criticizing the Vietnam

War since the very beginning of US involvement. The alternative press was widely read,

virulently anti-war, and at the forefront of the North Vietnamese information campaign.

International communism and the alternative press worked synergistically to undermine public

support for the Vietnam War in America.

12

Catholic Worker

One of the first to speak out against American intervention in Vietnam was Dorothy Day.

Day, a radical leftist, founded the Catholic Worker, a monthly New York City newspaper in

1933. In 1954, the Catholic Worker, with a circulation of 60,000, published a front-page

editorial by Dorothy Day. In it, she wrote “It is not Christianity and freedom we are defending in

the jungles of Vietnam, but our possessions.”33 She went on to write that the reason for our

involvement in Vietnam was that one third of US rubber came from there. Day posited that the

Vietnam War was a war for rubber. The Catholic Worker and Dorothy. Day continued their

criticism throughout the war, maintaining that the war was being fought to keep the flow of

inexpensive rubber coming into America. In addition to criticizing the war in print, Day and the

Worker called for action. In 1965 Day, in a Worker editorial, called for every young man in

America to refuse to serve in the armed forces. Day committed a federal crime by encouraging

others to avoid service, however, she was never prosecuted for it.34

I.F. Stone Weekly

While Day and the Catholic Worker were the first to speak out against the Vietnam War, they

were not operating alone. Isidor Feinstein Stone founded the I.F. Stone Weekly in 1953. By the

early 1960s, the I.F. Stone Weekly had a circulation of over 70,000.35 The I.F. Stone Weekly was

notable for publishing extremely graphic photographs of the effects of the Vietnam War.

Graphic photographs of maimed Vietnamese civilians were regular items in Stone’s work. Stone

called for a total withdrawal of American troops from Vietnam from early 1962 on. He was also

instrumental in generating interest in an anti-war movement. Stone was the featured speaker at

what some scholars consider the first major public demonstration against the war in the spring of

13

1965 in Washington, D.C. Later the same year, Stone devoted an entire issue of his weekly to

the growing anti-war movement.36

Ramparts

Ramparts, a Catholic journal launched its own campaign against the Vietnam War in July

1965 with a critique titled “The Vietnam Lobby.”37 Ramparts followed up in February 1966

with a twelve-page anti-war interview of former Green Beret Master Sergeant Donald Duncan.

In the article, Duncan claimed that American soldiers routinely tortured and murdered civilians,

operated assassination squads in nearby neutral countries, and greatly exaggerated reported body

counts. In 1967, Dr. Benjamin Spock, a world-renowned pediatrician, wrote about his

assessment that over one million Vietnamese children had been killed or wounded, most of them

with little or no access to medical treatment for their wounds.38 Ramparts included sixteen

glossy pages of color photos of maimed Vietnamese children with Dr. Spock’s article. By 1967,

Ramparts’ distribution was up to 250,000, making it the most widely read of the alternative

media sources.

National Guardian

The National Guardian joined the Catholic Worker, Ramparts and the I.F. Stone Weekly

as a major anti-war publication when, in 1964, its editor, James Aronson, published the headline

“It’s time for a broad US peace movement,” and began offering accounts of the war written by

Wilfred Burchett. Burchett, an Australian journalist and self-professed Communist sympathizer

had access to North Vietnamese military and leadership. The National Guardian’s 25,000

subscribers, through Burchett, had a behind the scenes view of the war39 from the enemy camp.

Through his stories in the National Guardian, Wilfred Burchett played a major role in

galvanizing public opinion against the war. His writings were anti-war and anti-American

14

throughout. Burchett’s unusual access and strong, well-informed anti-war articles gave him

considerable sway over public opinion. Through Burchett and the National Guardian, the

American people had a steady stream of alternative news from Vietnam. That the news was

from a self-professed communist sympathizer did nothing to lessen the impact Burchett’s stories

had on American public opinion.

Impact

America’s alternative press had a combined circulation of more than 400,000 by 1967,

and they used their platforms to relentlessly criticize America’s role in Vietnam. They did more

than report the facts; they called for civil action against the Vietnam War. Ramparts format of

investigative journalism make it difficult to directly call for action,40 but the Catholic Worker,

I.F. Stone Weekly, and National Guardian had no such limitations. Stone and Day agitated at

anti-war demonstrations and propagandized in print, while Wilfred Burchett spread North

Vietnamese propaganda directly from the source.

Whether trying to convince the American people that Vietnam was a war for rubber, or

acting as a conduit for a communist sympathizer to publish North Vietnamese propaganda, the

alternative press made a significant contribution to the communist propaganda effort. They

contributed to both the propaganda and agitation elements of communist ideas about the most

effective use of the press as “the sharpest weapon.”41

American Demonstrators

Agitators

While the alternative press in America kept up a constant barrage of anti-war propaganda,

they also worked to strengthen the anti-war demonstrations that became a force to be reckoned

with after Tet. Before a demonstration, the alternative papers would encourage their readers to

15

attend. Afterward, they provided verbatim transcripts of the speeches. While the propagandists

clearly opposed American policy in Vietnam, the agitators were more visible to the American

public, and more directly connected to Hanoi and the international communist movement.

When, in 1969, the North Vietnamese were not achieving their goal on the battlefield, they

coordinated with their American partners in the war. Their goal was to greatly expand

operations on U.S. soil through agitation. American demonstrators went right to work.

New MOBE

The most active anti-war demonstration organization was The New Mobilization

Committee to End the War in Vietnam (New MOBE). It was a “coalition of organizations, both

communist and noncommunist. Its basic organizational principle is nonexclusion. Were it not

for this “umbrella” nature of New MOBE, providing association with many sincerely motivated

noncommunists, the communists and subversives within the group would have little

effectiveness.”42 New MOBE descended lineally from the November 8 MOBE, then the Spring

MOBE and National MOBE. The Spring MOBE was “cited as communist-dominated in the

House Committee on Un-American Activities in a March 31, 1967 report on Communist Origin

and Manipulation of Vietnam Week.”43 New MOBE leadership’s official stance was “militantly

pro-Hanoi and anti-United States.”44 The chart below shows how deeply involved communists

were in New MOBE.

New MOBE

Name/New MOBE position

Communist Affiliation

Other Affiliation

Dave Dellinger, National Co-Chairman

Self-Professed Communist

5th Ave. Vietnam Peace Parade Committee

Dr. Sidney Peck, Wash. Action Committee

Communist Party U.S.A.

Case Western Reserve University, IUCDFP

Marjorie Colvin, National Committee

Socialist Workers Party

Sidney Lens, Steering Co-Chairman

Revolutionary Workers League

Chicago Peace Council

16

Jerry Gordon, National Committee

Labor Youth League

Sylvia Kushner, National Committee

Communist Party U.S.A.

Chicago Peace Council

Otto Nathan, National Committee

Communist Party of Germany

5th Ave. Vietnam Peace Parade Committee

Irving Sarnoff, National Committee

Communist Party U.S.A.

So. Cal. Peace Action Council

Dr. Douglass Dowd, Steering Committee

Hemispheric Conference

Cornell University, IUCDFP

Dr. Carleton Goodlett, New MOBE West Treas. World Peace Council

Publisher, Sun-Reporter, SF, CA

Dr. Robert Greenblatt, National Committee

Hemispheric Conference

Cornell University, IUCDFP

Notes: Inter-University Committee for Discussion of Foreign Policy (IUCDFP). This is a small representative sample of the connections

between communists and New MOBE. Hemispheric Conference to End the Vietnam War, Montreal, Canada, November 28 – December 1, 1968,

a meeting heavily attended by international communists. World Peace Council – established to be a Soviet controlled body.

Fig. 2

Communist and Other Subversive Affiliations of New MOBE Leaders45

On September 10-11, 1966 anti-war activists met in Cleveland, Ohio and formed the

November 8 Mobilization Committee. Of those who attended, nine were Communist Party or

DuBois club (C.P. U.S.A.’s youth arm) members, and at least 29 were members of the Socialist

Workers Party or its affiliate the Young Socialist Alliance.46 On November 26-27, activists held

another conference in Cleveland. They reconstituted themselves at the Spring Mobilization

Committee. Of the 117 attendees, 75 were members of Socialist groups. During a steering

committee meeting on the 27th, of 19 attendees, six were Socialists, and another six

communists.47 After the National Anti-War Conference in May of 1967 in Washington, D.C.,

the Spring MOBE became the National MOBE. Of the 700 people registered for the conference,

over 300 were members of a communist or socialist organization.48 The National MOBE

undertook major projects from its inception through its disestablishment. In 1967, the National

MOBE organized a march on the Pentagon, they disrupted 1968 Democratic National

Convention in Chicago., and in 1969 had a counter-inaugural demonstration. Notable is that the

National MOBE activities were all marked by violence.49 When the House Committee on Un-

American Activities examined the demonstrations in detail, they had evidence of extensive

17

contact between National MOBE leaders and foreign communist leaders and powers.50 The New

MOBE was officially established at another meeting in Cleveland over the 4th of July weekend in

1969.

Although there were a great number of organizations and individuals involved in the anti-

war demonstrations during the Vietnam War, the New MOBE, because it acted as an umbrella

organization that helped synchronize and focus the efforts of other organizations stands out as

the most significant. In Vietnam, Hanoi indicated its appreciation to the demonstrators for their

efforts in 1967 by broadcasting “We highly value the American people’s movement against the

U.S. war in Vietnam and regard this movement as a just and valiant action. May the Oct. 21

struggle mark a new development in the American people’s movement for an end of the U.S. war

in Vietnam. We wish you brilliant success.”51 Additionally, North Vietnamese premier Pham

Von Dong stated “The Vietnamese people thank their friends in America and wish them great

success in their mounting movement.”52

Agitation

From the small April 17, 1965 student march on Washington, organized by Students for a

Democratic Society (SDS, led by Tom Hayden), the anti-war agitation steadily increased in size

and intensity. November 5, 1966 20,000 marched in New York City. Many were identified as

members of the Communist Party, Socialist Workers Party and Workers World Party, carrying

signs that read “Defeat the U.S. Imperialists – Victory for the NLF”53 (National Liberation Front

– North Vietnamese Communists). Protests grew larger, and on April 15, 1967 100,000

protesters marched in New York City. An additional 40,000 attended a rally in San Francisco.54

October 21, 1967 over 30,000 participated in a rally at the Lincoln Memorial and civil

disobedience at the Pentagon. Anti-war protests continued to gain momentum, and November

18

15, 1969 an estimated 250,000 protesters gathered in Washington D.C. The size, scope,

intensity, and frequency of the protests began to make a serious impression on U.S. national

leaders. So much so that May 5, 1970 the following quote appeared in the Congressional

Record.

Up to now, we have not been losing the war in Southeast Asia. But,

unfortunately, and to the delight of the enemy, there is some danger that we could

lose in the United States a war that the enemy has been unable to win on the

battlefield in Southeast Asia.55

The Communist Strategy

Vietnam’s American Information Warriors

North Vietnamese General Vo Nguyen Giap commanded the Vietnamese victory at Dien

Bien Phu. The General was a proven military leader, accustomed to victory and unwilling to

accept less. In 1969 Giap sought to develop a strategy to defeat an American force that had been

able to repeatedly best him on the battlefield. Hanoi’s most formidable military leader was a

strategic thinker who realized that “some of North Vietnam’s most effective allies were in the

United States. American Communist party members, ambitious politicians, and manipulable

college students composed a large and active part of the forces Hanoi had at its disposal.”56

These forces were well motivated to assist Hanoi, as evidence by the text of a letter from

Tom Hayden to a North Vietnamese Colonel below.

June 4, 1968

Dear Col. Lao:

19

This note is to introduce you to Mr. Robert Greenblatt, the coordinator or the

National Mobilization to End the War in Vietnam. He works closely with myself

and Dave Dellinger, and has just returned from Hanoi. If there are any pressing

questions you wish to discuss, Mr. Greenblatt will be in Paris for a few days. We

hope that the current Paris discussions go well for you. The news from South

Vietnam seems very good indeed. We hope to see you this summer in Paris or at

a later time.

Good fortune!

Victory!

/s/ Tom Hayden57

General Giap was aided when “Louis Schneider of the American Friends Service

Committee and James Forest of the World Peace Council appeared in Hanoi in December 1969

as part of a six man peace group arranging an antiwar conference in Stockholm. During a

meeting with North Vietnamese premier Pham Van Dong and Vietcong representative Trung

Cong Dong, the delegates coordinated their plans with those of General Giap. Collectively, they

decided the spring 1970 antiwar program would operate under the slogan “Vietnam Appeal.”58

After the meeting, the Americans proceeded to Stockholm and met with members of the New

MOBE.

Hanoi established a solid connection with American agitators through a variety of

individuals as they traveled to North Vietnam for strategy sessions with the communists. Tom

Hayden from SDS, as well as members of New MOBE helped the North Vietnamese fight their

information war on American soil. Propagandists had already been helping Hanoi. “Ho Chi

20

Minh, having failed to defeat the South Vietnamese militarily is now using another weapon, one

as cleverly conceived as the poison tipped bamboo spikes his men plant underfoot for the unwary

enemy. He plans to force a halt in American bombing by (a) mobilizing pressure on the United

States from the non-Communist world and by (b) creating pressures on President Johnson within

this country. The New York Times’ Harrison Salisbury is Ho’s chosen weapon. Soviet

diplomats in Washington appear to think that Salisbury’s reports of death and injury to civilians

and destruction of non-military targets could do the trick.”59 This 1967 Washington Post article

exposes a miniscule fraction of the overall strategy. Alongside mainstream journalists from

respected media outlets were paid propagandists. Wilfred Burchett of the National Guardian

used his access for maximum effect. Unknown at the time were that: Burchett had assisted the

communist North Koreans with their interrogations of Australian, U.S., and U.K. prisoners of

war during the Korean War (from eyewitness testimony during the Jack Kane libel trial in

Australia) and that he had been on the Soviet KGB payroll (KGB defector Yuri Krotkov in

testimony to the U.S. Senate).60

Truong Chinh’s Playbook Revisited

The Communist public opinion strategy against the United States was a natural extension

of their strategy against the French. Truong Chinh (Secretary General of the Lao Dong

(Communist) Party and President of the Marxist Study Group)61 describes how to fight the

French “concerning our foreign policy, we must isolate the enemy, win more friends. We must

act so the French people will actively support us. The French people and soldiers should oppose

the war by every means: oppose sending troops to Indochina, they should demand peaceful

negotiations with the Ho Chi Minh government.62 The political situation in France is confused.

The antiwar movement has been launched, the general Confederation of Labour organized many

21

demonstrations. In the future, the antiwar movement in France will grow extensively.”63 When

employing propaganda against the United States, the communists in Hanoi executed a very

similar strategy to the one they had used against the French.

While Americans viewed the press mainly as a vehicle for informing the public with the

objective truth, North Vietnamese had a very different view of the function of the press.

Through the writings of Vladmir Lenin, they saw the press purely as a political instrument.

Lenin described the press as the “most important tool, the sharpest weapon,”64 it is used to

educate and agitate the people and give them the correct outlook.65 The North Vietnamese

understood the press to be a powerful force for spreading ideas and gave no credence to the

concept of an objective press. Lenin saw the press as inherently biased and having only one

valid function, that of spreading the ideas of Communism to the people. The Communists saw

the press as a weapon, and that is precisely how they used it. They used the media and

demonstrations in an integrated information strategy. Their strategy paralleled Lenin’s writing

on the need for both propaganda and agitation. He described propaganda as the written word and

agitation as the living word.66

Ho Chi Minh was trained in Marxism-Leninism in France and the Soviet Union. While

working in Paris after the First World War, he joined the French Socialist Party and began his

study of socialism. Ho’s patriotism fueled his initial attraction to Communism. He read Lenin’s

“Thesis on the National and Colonial Questions” and took from it the antipathy Lenin had for the

colonial system at the time.67 Later, he spent time in the Soviet Union and China undergoing

training and organizing Vietnamese exiles. Ho Chi Minh’s education included the Marxist-

Leninist theories concerning the value and nature of the press, news, propaganda and agitation.

Ho’s training prepared him to develop a cohesive press, propaganda, and agitation strategy for

22

the war against the United States. Hanoi was waging information warfare long before the West

popularized the term. His skillful exploitation of the information sphere during the Vietnam War

should serve as a lesson to us today.

Understanding Vietnamese Success

Vietnamese communist’s information warfare strategy against the United States was

successful for three reasons. First, the communist’s strategy in the United States depended upon

an active, robust community of supporters in America willing to act as their proxies. The Wall

Street Journal illustrated the importance of this movement in an interview with Bui Tin, a

Colonel on the North Vietnamese Army General Staff, published 03 August 1995. Mr. Tin was

asked if the American antiwar movement was important to Hanoi's victory. Mr. Tin responded

"It was essential to our strategy. Support of the war from our rear was completely secure while

the American rear was vulnerable.68 Second, the Communist strategy put the United States on

the horns of a dilemma. Continue to allow the Vietnamese Communists to use the First

Amendment guarantees in the U.S. Constitution as an enabling agent for their information war,

or shut down their American campaign and violate the values we hold dear in the process. Third,

the Communist campaign was successful because they were the only ones fighting it. While

Americans counted bodies, compared forces, and arrogantly concluded we could not lose the

war, the Vietnamese had a wider view of the war. They saw the American public’s will as a

center of gravity, and they attacked it relentlessly.

Recommendations for the Future

Building a New Relationship

The United States military needs to continue to work with the media, it also needs to

rethink the military-media relationship. This rethought relationship must adhere scrupulously to

23

the U.S. Constitution, but need not rely on the established relationship of the past. One of the

societal changes the military must consider when planning a new relationship is that since the

elimination of the draft, only a small percentage of the population has ever served on active duty,

and an even smaller portion of the American public has ever served in combat. Few members of

the media have military experience or enough knowledge of military matters to serve the public

well in reporting military matters. The nature of information delivery systems, the media itself,

and war have all changed with the times. Military forces have been transforming for years, as

has the nature of who and how we fight. Now we fight a globally networked, elusive, shadowy

terrorist enemy, yet we maintain a government-media relationship paradigm shaped in the 1960s.

This is to our great disadvantage. Knowledge travels nearly instantaneously, tactical actions can

have rapid global effects, and America’s enemies broadcast their propaganda internationally

through media outlets with no national allegiance. Stories are broadcast and printed before they

are fact checked, and if found to be in error, retractions are either buried or non-existent.

Technological innovation has enabled journalists to operate independently from

anywhere in the world. With a digital camera, a satellite phone, and a laptop, a journalist can

witness an event, take still photographs, write a story, and transmit the text and photos nearly

instantaneously. The media has changed along with the technology that enables it. With global

markets, 24-hour news coverage is required. The 24-hour cycle needs stories, and the speed with

which stories develop precludes rigorous analysis or fact checking. It is easy to keep the

relationship as it is, and when we change there will be resistance, pressure, and friction. We

need the energy to overcome these inhibiting forces and shape the future relationship to our

advantage. The media has changed, the military has transformed, and war has evolved. The way

24

we think about knowledge and information has undergone a radical shift, and the relationships

between these elements and the military should change as well.

A Medium Not an Institution

The U.S. military should stop viewing the media as an institution, a fourth branch of

government, and start viewing it as a medium through which the weapons of information warfare

travel. This medium is highly filtered and selective at certain access points such as media

organizations, and unfiltered at other access points such as Internet sites. The information

revolution has transformed the media from a hierarchical institution with the elite newspapers

and major broadcast outlets and the top into a medium composed of the elite media and any

individual with a computer and a connection to the Internet. Personal web logs (blogs) are as

easy to access as major media web sites from a home computer. Access to the public and

exercise of the U.S. Constitution’s First Amendment are no longer limited to those with the

capital to print and distribute newspapers or establish television broadcast outlets. The

information revolution has democratized the media. As access to the public sphere has increased

dramatically, so have the problems of finding the right places to access in order to effectively

counter enemy propaganda.

The Elite Media

Considering the media as a medium rather than an institution does nothing to change the

fact that some of the facets of the medium are disproportionately important. The elite media still

exists and the military must be extremely careful when dealing with it. First, lying to the media

is bad strategy. During the Vietnam War, the credibility gap was largely attributable to the U.S.

government’s lies to the media. The North Vietnamese outflanked America on the information

front by exploiting the credibility gap. The U.S. military should tell the truth. This is especially

25

important when bad things happen. We should get bad news out before it leaks out. Leaks from

all branches of government have proven impossible to plug, so that leaves the military two

choices when bad things happen. Cover them up and suffer the inevitable exposure or get the

stories out fast, blunting the long-term negative effects.

While this is should be standard procedure, it does nothing to address the serious problem

of internal military information security. Information warfare is real warfare, and the military

must do a better job of ensuring it controls information flow outside the organization. All DoD

employees, be they military or civilian, should be legally required through their employment

contracts to report all media contacts. Tracking all media contacts and making failure to report a

condition for employment termination for civilians and military members would be a start

toward improving information security and managing the flow of information outside DoD.

Embedding

U.S. military leaders should embed Public Affairs personnel within elite media outlets.

Military personnel inside the elite media could assist both the media and the military. For the

media, having an immediately accessible source with experience and contacts within DoD could

help them present more accurate information to the public without costing them the time that

doing research to support a story would cost them. For the military, this liaison could get

information about enemy propaganda as it arrives, and begin the process of countering that

propaganda early in the life cycle of the story. Embedding these military people within

organizations could also have a long-term effect on the military-media relationship. By building

social relationships with their media counterparts, these embedded Public Affairs personnel can

begin a process of establishing mutual respect during periods other than major combat. During

26

major combat, reporters embedded within front line combat units got a chance to know military

people. Embedding military people with elite media outlets could continue the process.

Exploit the Medium

The media is a pervasive medium; however, since the U.S. military cannot be everywhere

simultaneously, the U.S. must inject information where it will have the greatest effect.

Additionally, enemy information distribution must be limited or eliminated. A vast amount of

data travels throughout the world in packets, and the military should monitor the flow of those

packets to determine how much friendly and enemy information is traveling at any time. Our

information operations should simultaneously seek to inject friendly information at media nodes

that have high traffic flows and reduce traffic to and from areas distributing enemy information.

In addition to managing where friendly forces inject information and disrupting

distribution of enemy information, U.S. forces should establish their own information injection

points both overtly and covertly. The U.S. military should exploit web logs, web sites, and chat

rooms that affect popular attitudes. The filtering that takes place in traditional or elite media by

journalists does not interfere with the distribution of friendly information on the internet.

Information operators can disseminate their messages without the interference or distortion

introduced by intermediate parties.

Public Affairs

Public Affairs (PA) personnel operate in the medium through which information wars are

fought, and they are experts in that medium. The strict division between PA and information

operations is outdated and does not optimize the use of these trained experts. Doctrinally, PA

and Information Warfare personnel should operate together, taking advantage of each other’s

professional expertise. When dealing with the media, PA personnel do not spread

27

disinformation; however, their expertise needs to be put to much more effective combat use than

in the past.

PA has a role to play in advising commanders on the effects of military actions on public

opinion in America and abroad. For PA to realize its potential as a force enabler, it needs to use

its knowledge of the media to predict effects on populations and ensure commanders hear those

predictions. PA should take the lead in inoculating U.S. forces against being limited in their

ability to produce battlefield effects because of public opinion. This will require PA

involvement in every step from planning to execution. For PA to provide the manpower to do

this work well will necessarily entail dedicating more people to working with staffs, planning

teams, and in operations centers. PA does not have the manpower to do this work right now.

The only way senior leaders will give PA the manpower to do this work in the future is for the

limited manpower available to be overworked and over deployed now. If PA is going to get

more people to do the job, the people in PA right now are going to have to do the hard work of

establishing their operational value and credibility with commanders.

In order to establish credibility and prove their value to combatant commanders, PA

should place increased emphasis on gaining operational experience and reduce stove piped career

tracks. PA needs people who can speak the operator’s language, extract information from the

same sources as operators, and display a broad range of general military knowledge. PME is a

start, but nothing can replace having PA sitting in an operations center, being able to understand

the military situation, and provide operators with sound advice, in their language, as current

operations play out. Additionally, PA professionals should be educated in a broad variety of

disciplines to help them predict effects accurately. Continuing education in marketing,

sociology, and psychology will help PA in their role as key advisors to combatant commanders.

28

Summary

Early in the Vietnam War, the Kennedy administration made a political decision to

deceive the American press and people about the nature and scope of U.S. government

involvement in the conflict. That political decision led to the eventual loss of government

credibility to the media and the public. The loss of credibility left the government unable to fight

the information war that Hanoi was waging on the American homeland. Having given the

enemy the media weapon, the government was impotent to stop the communist agitation and

propaganda campaigns.

The communist agitation and propaganda campaigns were mutually supportive, gaining

strength through a synergy enable by the American media. Propagandists wrote articles that

motivated masses of people to join protests, the media covered the protests, then the

propagandists wrote about the discontent evidenced by the large protests.

Eventually, Hanoi’s strategic information campaign succeeded in lowering American

public support for the Vietnam War to a level that made continuation of American involvement

impossible for the U.S. government.

It is in the government’s best interest to conduct a thorough preparation of the

information battlefield before engaging the military instrument. The government should begin

by gathering public support for action, flooding the media with its message, and telling whatever

portion of the truth it is appropriate to disclose. Those charged with generating the government’s

message and building popular support should start with a basic planning assumption that any lie

will be discovered. The U.S. government should avoid making statements that will reduce its

credibility when they are found to be false. National Security will demand secrecy at times,

however, lying has a profoundly negative effect on credibility. If the U.S. government loses its

29

credibility, the American home front may be undefended against attack from an enemy

information campaign, especially if skillfully carried out by American proxies. The U.S.

military should tell the truth.

The U.S. government should present a united front to the world. The President leads both

the armed forces and bureaucracy, and should receive the same support from both. The military,

from flag officer to junior enlisted, and the bureaucracy, from departmental Secretary to office

secretary all need to be part of the information war. The U.S. military should put an end to

unauthorized leaks and enforce information security.

The U.S. military should view the media as a medium rather than an institution, and

should develop a new relationship with the media based upon that concept. Military operators

should learn to exploit the media medium as those before them have learned to operate on land,

in the air, and in space. Much of the media is no longer under the control of newspapers and

broadcast outlets, and the military should exploit that portion of the medium to the maximum

extent possible. When dealing with the elite media, the U.S. military should seek to embed PA

personnel with them.

PA should be an integral part of planning and operations at every level, and must be

manned for it. For PA to realize its potential as a force enabler, PA professionals need

operational experience, broad general military knowledge, and to move away from stove piped

career tracks. Additionally, the U.S. military should educate PA professionals in a broad variety

of disciplines. Continuing education in the fields of marketing, sociology, and psychology will

enhance PA’s ability to predict effects for their commanders.

30

Notes

1. Hedrick Smith, The Kennedy Years: 1961-1962, 01 February 1963, The Vietnam

Archive, Texas Tech University,

http://star.vietnam.ttu.edu/starweb/vva/servlet.starweb?path=vva/vva.web document

2130305002, 1.

2. Marvin E. Gettleman, Vietnam: History, Documents, and Opinions, (New York, N.Y.:

New American Library, 1970), 118.

3. Ibid., 133.

4. Ibid., 119.

5. Ibid., 274.

6. Ibid, 322.

7. Peter Young and Peter Jesser, The Media and the Military: From the Crimea to Desert

Strike, New York, N.Y.: St. Martin’s Press, 1997, 80.

8. Ibid., 91.

9. Louis A. Fanning, Betrayal In Vietnam, New Rochelle, N.Y.: Arlington House

Publishers, 1976, 19.

10. Ibid.

11. Young, The Media and the Military: From the Crimea to Desert Strike, 80.

12. Ibid., 89.

13. George C. Herring, America’s Longest War: The United States and Vietnam 1950-

1975, 3rd ed., New York, N.Y.: McGraw-Hill, Inc., 1996, 83.

14. Ibid., 96.

15. Smith, The Kennedy Years: 1961-1962, 1.

16. Fanning, Betrayal In Vietnam, 16.

17. Bernard C. Cohen, The Press and Foreign Policy, Princeton, N.J.: Princeton

University Press, 1963, 28.

31

Notes

18. Hoang Van Chi, From Colonialism to Communism: A Case History of North

Vietnam, New York, N.Y.: Frederick A. Praeger, 1964, 39.

19. Anthony Buzek, How the Communist Press Works, New York, N.Y.: Frederick A.

Praeger, 1964, 8.

20. Chi, From Colonialism to Communism: A Case History of North Vietnam, 40.

21. Bernard B. Fall, The Viet Minh Regime: Government and Administration in the

Democratic Republic of Vietnam, New York, N.Y.: Institute of Pacific Relations, 1954, 65.

22. Young, The Media and the Military: From the Crimea to Desert Strike, 80.

23. Herring, America’s Longest War: The United States and Vietnam 1950-1975, 221.

24. Young, The Media and the Military: From the Crimea to Desert Strike, 91.

25. Herring, America’s Longest War: The United States and Vietnam 1950-1975, 203.

26. Fanning, Betrayal In Vietnam, 19.

27. Ibid.

28. Young, The Media and the Military: From the Crimea to Desert Strike, 88.

29. Ibid., 91.

30. Ibid.

31. Ibid.

32. Rodger Streitmatter, Voices of Revolution: The Dissident Press in America, New

York, N.Y.: Columbia University Press, 2001, 197.

33. Ibid., 185.

34. Ibid., 195.

35. Ibid., 187.

36. Ibid., 194.

32

Notes

37. Streitmatter, Voices of Revolution: The Dissident Press in America, 192.

38. Ibid. 193.

39. Ibid., 184.

40. Ibid., 196.

41. Buzek, How the Communist Press Works, 8.

42. Committee on Internal Security House of Representatives, Ninety-First Congress,

Subversive Involvement in the Origin, Leadership, and Activities of the New Mobilization

Committee to End the War in Vietnam and its Predecessor Organizations, Washington, D.C.:

U.S. Government Printing Office, 1970. The Vietnam Archive, Texas Tech University,

http://star.vietnam.ttu.edu/starweb/vva/servlet.starweb?path=vva/vva.web document

239093004A, vi.

43. Ibid., VII.

44. Ibid

45. Ibid., ix-9.

46. Ibid., 2.

47. Ibid., 3.

48. Ibid., 7.

49. Ibid., 2.

50. Ibid., 9.

51. Ibid.

52. Ibid.

53. Ibid, 2.

54. Ibid., 6.

55. Fanning, Betrayal In Vietnam, 43.

33

Notes

56. Fanning, Betrayal In Vietnam, 51.

57. Committee on Internal Security House of Representatives, Ninety-First Congress,

Subversive Involvement in the Origin, Leadership, and Activities of the New Mobilization

Committee to End the War in Vietnam and its Predecessor Organizations, 12.

58. Fanning, Betrayal In Vietnam, 51.

59. Chalmers M. Roberts, Ho Tries a New Propaganda Weapon, Washington D.C.,

Washington Post: January 2, 1967.

60. Gerard Jackson, The Mass Media’s Love Affair With the Traitor Wilfred Burchett,

BrookesNews.com, http://www.newaus.com.au/040908-mass-media.html, 9 August 2004, 1,2.

61. Bernard B. Fall, The Viet Minh Regime: Government and Administration in the

Democratic Republic of Vietnam, New York, N.Y.: Institute of Pacific Relations, 1956, 44.

62. Truong Chinh, The Resistance Will Win. With an Introduction by Bernard B. Fall.

New York: Praeger, (1963; repr. Maxwell AFB, AL: Air University Press SW Coursebook,

2004), 425-426. Citations are to the Maxwell edition.

63. Ibid, 438.

64. Buzek, How the Communist Press Works, 8.

65. Ibid., 169.

66. Ibid., 24.

67. Gettleman, Vietnam: History, Documents, and Opinions, 45.

68. Stephen Young, How North Vietnam Won the War, New York, N.Y., Wall Street

Journal, 03 August 1995.

34

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36